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1. 109. The State Department submits to the NSC a report on "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," which analyzes the problem to determine measures to protect U.S. security in Indochina and prevent communist expansion in the area. NSC No. 64, 27 February 1950.....
2. 111. The State Department maintains to the Department of Defense that Indochina is subject to immediate danger and is the "most strategically important area of Southeast Asia." Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S. should be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further Communist encroachment." Dean Rusk, Deputy Undersecretary of State to General James H. Burns, Defense Representative to Southeast Asia Aid Committee, 7 March 1950.....
3. 127. Department of State requests an assessment of the strategic aspects of Indochina from a military point of view because of the threat of communist domination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that the "mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States," because of the requirement to stockpile strategic materials acquired there, as well as the threat to other states on the "line of containment." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 10 April 1950.....
4. 121. Griffin reconstructs the Indochina situation for Secretary Acheson. Griffin indicates that the present status quo cannot be maintained. "Time is of the essence...." if Bao Dai starts to slip, "it will be impossible to restore him." Given that the French are aware that a military solution is unattainable, "the U.S. must find out what the French expect of Vietnam." Griffin Memorandum to Secretary of State, 4 May 1950.....
5. 122. The special survey mission headed by R. Allen Griffin recommends a modest \$60 million economic and technical assistance program for Southeast Asia. State press release 485, 11 May 1950.....
6. 125. U.S. formally announces intent to establish an economic aid mission to the three Associated States of Indochina. State press release 545, 25 May 1950.....
7. 126. On the basis of the Griffin recommendations, the U.S publicly announces the launching of a program of rapid economic aid to Southeast Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson letter to R. Allen Griffin, 3 June 1950.....



8. 127. North Korea attacks South Korea and President Truman announces U.S. military assistance not only to South Korea but also an "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission...." Presidential Statement, 27 June 1950.....

9. 129. A summary of existing policy on Indochina reveals the JCS view on NSC 73 that the U.S. give consideration to providing air and naval assistance should the Chinese provide overt support to the Viet Minh. Consultants' Meeting, 25 July 1950.....

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10. 161. The NSC considers the consequences to the United States of communist domination of Southeast Asia. Loss of Southeast Asia is seen as putting economic and political pressures on Japan, opening sources of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc, rendering the U.S. position in the Pacific precarious and jeopardizing lines of communication and trade routes to South Asia. If Red China intervenes, the U.S. should take appropriate military action as part of a U.N. action or in conjunction with others but not unilaterally. Annex to NSC 124, 13 February 1952.....

11. 164. If the Chinese invade Indochina, "he [Acheson] said it was clear that it was futile and a mistake to defend Indochina in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea.... we could not put ground troops in Indochina....our only hope was of changing the Chinese mind." Secretary of State Note (L.D. Battle), 17 June 1952.....

12. 169. Acheson publicly announces optimism over the conduct of the National armies in Indochina and that communist "aggression has been checked" and that the "tide is now moving in our favor." State Department Release 473, 18 June 1952.....

13. 170. The President approves NSC 124/2 (NSC 124/1 as amended) on the U.S. objectives and courses of action with respect to Southeast Asia. With respect to Indochina, the U.S. would continue to assure the French of the international interest of the Indochina effort; use U.S. influence to promote political, military, economic, and social policies; provide increased aid in the absence of overt Chinese aggression; oppose French withdrawal; and seek collective action against Red China intervention. NSC 124/2, 25 June 1952.....



14. 17A. The U.S. and Britain discuss issuing a warning to Red China on intervention in Indochina. French successes could trigger Chinese intervention and the U.S. had "no infantry available for operations within Indochina." The U.S. thinking is along the lines of a naval blockade of China's coast. London Ministerial Talks, 26 June 1952.....

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15. 24. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that Communist China will not invade Indochina even though hostilities conclude in Korea. The French situation, however, is expected to continue to deteriorate while the Viet Minh prestige increases. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-91, 4 June 1953.....

16. 34. The State Department recommends to the NSC an increase in aid to France of \$400 million in the current fiscal year. Memorandum for NSC, 5 August 1953.....

17. 36. The JCS learn that Secretary of Defense plans to forward their 11 August memorandum to Secretary of State so a new memorandum is drafted which makes changes to certain "overly optimistic" statements with respect to "promises of success offered by the Navarre Concept." See documents numbered 13, 35, and 37 also. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1953.....

18. 45. President Eisenhower approves the statement of NSC 162/2 as basic national security policy which addresses the Soviet threat to U. S. security. NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953.....

19. 49. The CIA estimates the Chinese and Soviet reactions to U. S. intervention in Indochina with ground, air, and naval forces. It is anticipated that the Communist Bloc would not overtly intervene even though decisive defeat of the Viet Minh would result but would support and augment the Viet Minh to prolong the resistance. Special CIA Estimate, SE-53, 18 December 1953.....

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20. 51. The President approves the statement of policy in NSC 177, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," which views the loss of Indochina as having "most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests...." (NSC 177 was renumbered as NSC 5405) NSC 5405, 16 January 1954.....

21. 53. The President's Special Committee decides to recommend action on certain urgent French requests for twenty-two B-26 aircraft and two hundred Air Force mechanics for Indochina, and to await General O'Daniel's return before deciding on other requests. It is generally agreed that the importance to the U.S. of winning in Indochina could lead to intervention by U.S. air and naval forces -- but "not ground forces." ISA Memorandum for the Record, 30 January 1954.....



22. 57. The JCS express concern over developments in the status of the MAAG Chief to Indochina relative to a considerable increase in personnel and scope of training responsibilities. The French feel that "it should be clearly understood that neither O'Daniel nor MAAG was to have any powers, advisory or otherwise" in planning operations or training the national armies. The JCS feels a demotion of O'Daniel in deference to Navarre is detrimental to U. S. prestige. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 5 March 1954.....

23. 58. In the preparation of Defense Department views regarding negotiations on Indochina for the Geneva Conference, the JCS reaffirm their position concerning the strategic importance of Indochina to the security interests of the United States as reflected in NSC 5405. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 12 March 1954.....

24. 59. General Erskine submits the President's Special Committee recommendations on the military implications of the U. S. position on Indochina at Geneva. The analysis concludes that "no solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is acceptable." The conclusions expressed are felt to merit consideration by the NSC and the President. Erskine Memorandum for the Special Committee, NSC, 17 March 1954.....

25. 60. Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, is fully in accord with the JCS views (Document No. 43) and General Erskine's recommendations (Document No. 44), and recommends to Secretary Dulles that they be carefully considered in preparation for the Geneva Conference. Wilson letter to Dulles, 23 March 1954.....

26. 61. General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, is "unsympathetic" to the JCS view to expand MAAG, Indochina to assist in training Vietnamese. Ely feels it would encroach on French responsibilities, would affect "prestige" and shows lack of confidence in French leadership. (Annex A, Ely Memorandum for Radford; Annex B, JCS Memorandum for the President) JCS Memorandum for President's Committee, 29 March 1954.....

27. 62. The U. S. proposes a coalition of U. S., France, Associated States, U. K., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, which would fight in Indochina as an alternative to French Union surrender and as a position of strength going to Geneva. Dulles 3476 to Paris, 3 April 1954.....

28. 66. The British consider partition the "least undesirable settlement" for Indochina and had not developed thoughts on a confrontation with a French sell-out. Dulles 5177 to London, 4 April 1954.....

29. 67. The French request "immediate armed intervention of U. S. carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu" to save the situation. Admiral Radford had previously assured Ely that he would "do his best" to obtain the U. S. support. Paris 3710 to Dulles, 4 April 1954.....



30. 68. NSC Action No. 1074-A considers the problem of determining the circumstances, conditions, and extent to which the U.S. should commit its resources to save Indochina. The problem involves four issues: (1) the prospect of loss of Indochina; (2) the risks, requirements, and consequences of intervention; (3) desirability and form of U. S. intervention; and (4) the timing and circumstances of intervention. NSC Action 1074-A, 5 April 1954.....

31. 69. The U. S. Army position on intervention in Indochina cites the military disadvantages of such action. Specifically, the Army views are that air and naval forces alone cannot assure victory; that atomic weapons do not reduce the number of ground troops required; that at least seven U. S. divisions with air and naval support are required to win if the French withdraw and the Chinese do not intervene; and that the equivalent of twelve U. S. divisions are required if the Chinese intervene. Army Position on NSC Action No. 1074-A (undated).....

32. 70. The President's Special Committee submits recommendations concerning longer range policy and courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not covered by NSC 5405. It is recommended that the U. S. accept nothing short of military victory, oppose a negotiated settlement at Geneva, pressure the Associated States to continue the war with U. S. support even if negotiations succeed, and seek participation of other nations. Regardless of the outcome of current operations in Indochina, the U. S. in all prudence should develop a regional defense posture incorporating all the Southeast Asian states. Part II, Special Committee Report on Southeast Asia, 5 April 1954.....

33. 72. "U. S. is doing everything possible....to prepare public, Congressional, and constitutional basis for united action in Indochina." However, such action is considered "impossible" except on a coalition basis with British Commonwealth participation. Dulles 3482 to Paris, 5 April 1954.....

34. 73. France feels that the time for formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be decided in the next ten days at Dien Bien Phu. Dillon (Paris) 3729 to Dulles, 5 April 1954.....

35. 75. Eden feels the seriousness of the French military situation is exaggerated -- "French cannot lose the war between now and the coming of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it." London 4382 to Dulles, 6 April 1954.....



36. 82. Eden informs Dulles that Britain is strongly opposed to intervention at Dien Bien Phu and intends to lend only diplomatic support to France at Geneva in search of a settlement. DULTE 5 (Geneva) to Washington, 25 April 1954.....
37. 83. Dulles expresses "dismay that the British are apparently encouraging the French in a direction of surrender which is in conflict not only with our interest but what I [Dulles] conceive theirs to be." DULTE 9, 26 April 1954.....
38. 85. Dulles and Eden exchange frank and heated words over the British pressuring France for a cease-fire. The U. S. indicates that the tripartite position is poor, i.e., not "very impressive or cohesive" and that "the other side" was worried -- but not about Britain. The U. S. is also concerned over the affects on NATO, EDC and the entire defense structure in Europe. DULTE 13, 27 April 1954.....
39. 86. Dulles makes an estimate of rapidly moving developments: (1) when Dien Bien Phu falls, the French Government will change, probably to the left, committed to liquidate China. A withdrawal of forces to defensible enclaves under U.S. protection with subsequent U.S. training of native armies is considered. Open intervention at this point would be answered by Chinese intervention, (2) U.K. attitude is one of increasing weakness, (3) "the decline of France, the great weakness of Italy, and the considerable weakness of England create a situation where...we must be prepared to take the leadership...." DULTE 21, 29 April 1954.....
40. 88. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far-reaching and adverse repercussions, but would not signal the collapse of the French Union political and military situation in Indochina, nor would it substantially alter relative military capabilities of French and Viet Minh forces. The French Union could retain control of the cities though there would be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war. NIE 63-54, 30 April 1954.....
41. 89. Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, former Chief of MAAG, Indochina comments in his debriefing on the French situation in Indochina. His comments cover in detail the strategic position of Indochina, the government and its prosecution of the war, the performance of MDAF supported forces, the objectives of the opposing forces, the organization and tactics of both the French and Viet Minh forces. In Trapnell's view, few of the aims of the Navarre concept are progressing satisfactorily. "Dien Bien Phu is not only another Na San, but a grave



tactical and strategic error." On the political aspects of the war, Trapnell feels that "a strictly military solution to the war in Indochina is not possible...It is doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated States objectives." The solution in Indochina requires a strong French assault on the Viet Minh, training of National armies, a defensive alliance of Asian nations, and a guarantee of the Associated States borders. Trapnell recommends a U.S. training mission for Indochina, and concludes that victory in Indochina is international rather than local and essentially political as well as military. Major General Trapnell Debriefing, 3 May 1954.....

42. 92. The NSC 195th Meeting considers Secretary Dulles pessimistic report on Geneva to the President: (1) there is no responsible French Government to deal with, (2) the British reject the "regional grouping," (3) the British want secret talks on Southeast Asia, (4) the expected communist proposal is for foreign troop withdrawal and elections, (5) and the U.K. wants a settlement based on partition. ESC 195th Meeting, 6 May 1954.....

43. 93. Dulles briefs Congressional leaders on the Geneva Conference and reviews the weaknesses of Britain's position. Congress members comments are adverse. Dulles states three conclusions: (1) U.S. should not intervene militarily, (2) U.S. must push rapidly for a Southeast Asia community, (3) and the U.S. should not "write off" the British and French in spite of their weakness in Asia. TEDUL 37, 6 May 1954.....

44. 95. President Eisenhower makes it clear that the preconditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina are that the "U.S. would never intervene alone, that the indigenous people must invite intervention, and that there must be regional or collective action. The NSC action of the meeting on 5 April as pertains to paragraph 1.b. of the record (organizing a regional grouping) is approved by the President. Memorandum by R. Cutler, Special Assistant, for Secretary of Defense and CJCS and Meeting Minutes, 7 May 1954.....

45. 96. May 8 - July 21: Geneva Conference on Indochina. The 1st Plenary Session convenes on 8 May and hears proposals by France and the Viet Minh for cessation of hostilities and participation in the conference. (Excerpts) The delegates to the conference are from Great Britain and the USSR (joint chairmen), France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the Viet Minh regime. (Final agreements are signed on July 20 and 21, and the main provisions concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign military bases and personnel and on increased armaments, (3) countrywide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, are to be held



by July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Commission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to the agreements. The United States issues a unilateral declaration stating that it (1) "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements, (2) "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the afore-said agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security," and (3) "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly." Excerpts from 1st Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, 8 May 1954.....

46 97. The Defense member of the NSC Planning Board indicates the options available to the U.S. with regard to the Geneva results. General Bonesteel suggests that the increased risks associated with pressuring France to continue the war and possible U.S. intervention to stop the communist advance can "more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again." On the other hand, a compromise at Geneva would lead to communist subversion at a late date and U.S. involvement then might be inhibited by an increased Soviet nuclear capability. "Asia could thus be lost." General Bonesteel Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1954.....

47 103. Secretary Dulles forwards the basic instructions approved by the President for the head of the U.S. Delegation to Geneva. "The United States is not prepared to give its express or implied approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement...." which would subvert the local governments, impair territorial integrity, or jeopardize forces of the French Union. Dulles TOSEC 138 to Geneva, 12 May 1954.....

48 109. Secretary Stevens emphasizes the Army's concern over high-level official views that "air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indochina" and that the complex nature of these problems would require a major logistical effort -- "it explodes the myth that air and sea forces could solve the Indochina problems." Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 May 1954.....

49 121. The JCS recommend against a "Korea-type" defense of Southeast Asia as unsound. Accordingly, the U.S. "should adopt the concept of offensive actions against the 'military power of the aggressor,' (in this instance, Communist China) rather than local reaction to the attack. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 May 1954.....

50 214. The JCS point out their belief that, from the U.S. point of view with reference to the Far East, "Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954.....



51 115. The White House views the JCS position on intervention in Indochina as not involving any new policy issue relative to NSC 5405. However, a pencilled Secretary of Defense marginal note indicates that the White House "misses the point" -- the JCS was considering the "regional grouping" and others in the grouping, i.e., U.K. may object to NSC 5405 policy. Hence the JCS is warning "not to get involved in such a grouping" unless all parties accept direct action. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954.....

52 116. Ely emphasizes particular points to Trapnell and Dillon:  
(1) Ely was not in accord with O'Daniel's proposal to reorganize the Vietnamese army on a divisional basis,  
(2) O'Daniel's operational war plan was unrealistic,  
(3) the increasing frequency of American criticism of French conduct of the war was not appreciated, (4) Ely was regrouping his forces for defense of the Delta, and  
(5) one or two U.S. Marine divisions could assure defense of the Delta. Paris 4566 to Dulles, 27 May 1954.....

53. 126. General Valluy evaluates the Tonkin Delta military situation: (1) If Tonkin is lost, a military line will not be re-established, (2) in this connection, there are no South Vietnamese who could oppose North Vietnamese, (3) Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin and the political capital Hanoi, to be gained either by negotiation or military force as necessary, (4) if Tonkin is lost, France will not fight in the South, (5) nor would Vietnamese fight against other Vietnamese and sooner or later the whole of Vietnam will become communist. TEDUL 171, 7 June 1954.....

54. 131. Eden cites three major issues emerging on which "we cannot compromise": (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia problem, (2) status and powers of international supervisory authority and (3) composition of the international supervisory authority. Britain feels negotiations have failed and little can be salvaged in Vietnam. DULTE 164, 9 June 1954.....

56. 135. The French impression is that even after all conditions are met, the chances of U.S. participation are "nil." With this attitude it is only a matter of time until the French come to terms with the Viet Minh. The result would be disastrous to French public opinion and the "U.S. would be blamed" for having failed in the crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that the French be informed that "the President is no longer prepared to request military intervention" even if France fulfills all conditions. France should strive for an armistice and thus avoid a military disaster. A few months delay in communist takeover in Indochina is not commensurate with "possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe." Paris 4841 to Dulles, 14 June 1954.....



57. 136. The French want, and "in effect have, an option on our intervention, but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of our option is fast running out." TEDUL 197, 14 June 1954.....
58. 137. Secretary Dulles emphasizes that events have shown that predictions he has made all along on the lack of any real French desire for U.S. intervention but "as a card to play at Geneva." The U.S. does not see that France's bitterness is justified considering "prolonged French and U.K. indecision." Dulles 4579 to Paris, 14 June 1954....
59. 139. The CIA estimates communist reactions to the participation of U.S. air and naval forces at various levels of intensity and on various targets in conjunction with French Union forces in Indochina. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 10-4-54, 15 June 1954.....
60. 143. The "underground military talks" at Geneva are pointing toward a de facto partition of Indochina. "There can of course be no repeat no question of U.S. participation in any attempt to 'sell' a partition to non-communist Vietnamese." TEDUL 212, 17 June 1954.....
61. 144. U.S. re-examines possible de facto partition of Vietnam in light of five-power staff report suggesting Thakhek-Donghoi line. TEDUL 222, 18 June 1954.....
62. 145. The French feel that partition is the best settlement. they could have worked for under the conditions laid down by U.S. for intervention which "no French Parliament would approve." Partition should come as no surprise to the Vietnamese since the Viet Minh had made it clear to them -- "coalition government or partition." DULTE 195, 18 June 1954.....
63. 146. General Smith and Molotov conduct lengthy conversations on "making positions clear." The Soviet tactics were probably to forestall U.S. intervention in the Delta by a compromise formula if intervention appeared imminent. When intervention became improbable, the "ante" in negotiations was raised. DULTE 202, 19 June 1954.....
64. 147. In conversations with the French, China recognizes that "two governments" exist in Vietnam and Chou En-lai regards that the final political settlement should be reached by direct negotiations between the two governments. Paris 5035 to Dulles, 24 June 1954.....
65. 148. Dulles thinks our present role at Geneva should "soon be restricted to that of observer...." TOSEC 478, 24 June 1954.....



65. 149. A French aide-memoire indicates the French objective to seek a de facto division which leaves a solid territory for the State of Vietnam and further requests that the U.S. do nothing to encourage an anticipated "violent and unreasoning" reaction on the part of Vietnamese patriots who object to an indefinite period of division of the country. Dulles 4852 to Paris, 28 June 1954.....

67. 150. French negotiations with Viet Minh are stalled and Mendes-France is perplexed by reference to the "Dong Hoi" line since France was holding out for the 18th parallel. Paris 5117 to Dulles, 30 June 1954.....

68. 151. Dulles warns that Ngo Dinh Diem has been "kept in the dark" on French negotiations and fears that if revealed as a fait accompli the reaction French wish to avoid will result. Dulles 39 to Paris, 2 July 1954.....

69. 152. France apologizes for not keeping the U.S. fully informed of French military withdrawals in the Delta. In addition, while France is holding out for an eighteen-month period before elections, Diem, to the contrary, has suggested elections within a year. Paris 32 to Dulles, 2 July 1954....

70. 154. The U.S. does not want to be associated with a settlement which falls short of the seven-point memorandum on which Britain agreed and now appear to be less than firm. "If either or both the French and Communists are operating on the assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may be headed for serious trouble." Dulles 52 to Paris, 3 July 1954.....

71. 155. Dillon recommends that if the U.S. attempts to get the best possible settlement, we should (1) maintain a Geneva delegation, (2) have Dulles return to head the delegation, (3) offer French support to sell a settlement to Vietnam if it is satisfactory, and (4) pressure Britain to stick to the seven points of US-UK agreement. Paris 41 to Dulles, 4 July 1954.....

72. 158. Mendes-France will announce to the National Assembly that if a cease-fire is not agreed to prior to 21 July, it will be necessary for the Assembly to approve the sending of conscripts to Indochina. Paris 66 to Dulles, 6 July 1954.....

73. 159. Dulles informs Eden that it is "better if neither Bedell nor I went back" to Geneva since the French will probably settle for worse than the 7-point agreement, hence it would be embarrassing to all concerned. Dulles NIACT 101 to London, 7 July 1954.....

74. 160. The U.S. feels that elections mean eventual unification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and therefore should be held "as long after a cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation....". Further, the U.S. believes no date should be set now and that no conditions be accepted which would affect international supervision of elections. The U.S. would not oppose a settlement based on the 7-points nor would we seek to upset a settlement by force. Dulles 77 to Paris, 7 July 1954.....



75. 162. "I have never harbored any thought of wilful concealment...there is a certain lack of intimacy..." in relations with the present government. The U.S. intends to leave representation at Geneva but not Bedell Smith nor Dulles will return. The U.S. should avoid a "position at Geneva..." Dulles 85 to Paris, 8 July 1954.....

76. 163. The Chinese inform Ambassador Johnson that Chou En-lai had a "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and that "results would be helpful to the French." The French believe that the Sino-Soviet positions have been coordinated with the Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight. SECTO 578, 9 July 1954.....

77. 165. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles indicate firmly to President Mendes-France the rationale behind not sending Dulles or General Smith back to Geneva. Essentially, the rationale is based on failure of the U.S., U.K. and France to agree on a joint position at Geneva and lack of agreement on a "united action" proposal if the position is not accepted by the communists. Dulles sees France and U.K. enhancing a communist "whittling-away" process by readily accepting less than the seven points. Dulles 127 to Paris, 10 July 1954.....

78. 166. France views the Dulles decision as (1) making the French bargaining position weaker and (2) that Europe would interpret U.S. absence from Geneva as a step in the "return to a policy of isolationism." Paris 134 to Dulles, 11 July 1954.....

79. 167. France indicates the "necessity for a clear-cut U.S. guarantee that would protect the Associated States" if the communists did not honor a Geneva settlement. Mendes-France will resign if no cease-fire is reached. Paris 133 to Dulles, 11 July 1954.....

80. 169. Secretary Dulles reports on the Paris meeting: (1) an agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina which has the United States respecting terms conforming to a 7-point agreement; (2) the 7 points along the lines which were agreed during the Churchill-Eisenhower conversations; (3) a Mendes-France to Dulles letter which tells Dulles that his absence from Geneva would produce an effect opposite to his intention; (4) a Dulles to Mendes-France letter which informs him of General Smith's return to Geneva; (5) and a letter from Eden to Mendes-France reassuring him of Britain's support. Paris 179 to Dulles, 14 July 1954.....

81. 170. Secretary Dulles reports on his trip to Paris at the NSC meeting. Dulles had told Mendes that France's troubles stemmed from lack of a decision on EDC and the Soviets were successful in splitting France and Germany. If the U.S. cannot guarantee the Geneva Conference results or influence France to reject any settlement, the U.S. will be blamed and put a major strain on Franco-United States relations. NSC Minutes, 15 July 1954.....



82. 172. At a meeting of Mendes, Eden, and Molotov, the outstanding issues are summarized: (1) demarcation line for Vietnam; (2) elections; (3) control arrangements; (4) regroupment time; (5) prevention of arms importation, and (6) Laotian regroupment areas. France strongly opposes Molotov on holding elections in 1955 and placing the demarcation line at the 16th parallel. SECTO 632, 17 July 1954.....
83. 173. The Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference secretly passes the U.S. delegate a note of protest which had been handed to the French. The note complains that the "National Government of Vietnam has been left in complete ignorance" of proposals made by the French to other nations on Vietnam's fate. Vietnam rejects the de facto partition proposal, a cease-fire, and requests that United Nations control be established over all Vietnam territory. SECTO 633, 17 July 1954.....
84. 174. The Chinese Communists inform the U.S. of their position via Seymour Topping, Associated Press. The despatch reflects the views of Chou En-lai and demands that the U.S. guarantee a "partition peace plan." Further, China is hopeful of a cease-fire but did not rule out the chance for one even if the U.S. refuses to accept the armistice. SECTO 639, 18 July 1954.....
85. 175. The U.S. fears Britain will push France into an agreement short of the 7 points resulting in a situation which had been previously discussed in Paris. TOSEC 565, 18 July 1954.....
86. 176. At the 23rd Indochina restricted session, Tran Van Do (Vietnam) states that Vietnam cannot associate itself with the final declaration of the Conference which is to be reviewed. Vietnam does not agree to conditions for cease-fire nor have they as yet advanced proposals for a solution "based on peace, independence, and unity." SECTO 654, 18 July 1954.....
87. 177. The Vietnamese delegation requests a plenary session to put forward their position (Document 171, preceding). The U.S. replies that the Vietnamese position is "not practicable" and, in indicating that time is short, suggests that the Vietnamese "speak directly with the French." SECTO 655, 18 July 1954.....
88. 178. Seymour Topping again supplies confidential information from a Chinese Communist contact, Huang Hua. "When Huang Hua spoke of the possibility of American bases in Indochina, or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down..." Chinese are convinced that France and the U.S. have made a deal. SECTO 661, 19 July 1954.....



89. 185.

International control commission is to be composed of Poland, India, Canada, or Belgium. The U.S. is satisfied that this is better than Korea and is "within the spirit of Point 7." SECTO 666, 19 July 1954.....

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90. 186.

General Smith makes it clear to France that the U.S. could, under no circumstance, associate itself with the conference declaration and recommends authorization to amend the proposed U.S. declaration of position. SECTO 669, 19 July 1954.....

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91. 181.

Dulles has no objection on Smith's proposal to amend the declaration, but is concerned about including part of paragraph 9 of the Conference declaration, which seems to imply a "multilateral engagement with the Communists" which is inconsistent with the U.S. basic approach. TOSEC 576 NIACT, 19 July 1954.....

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92. 182.

The Vietnamese delegation proposes: (1) a cease-fire on present positions; (2) regroupment into two small zones; (3) disarmament of irregular troops; (4) disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops; and (5) control by the United Nations. It is noted that there is no provision for demarcation line or partition. SECTO 673, 19 July 1954.....

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93. 183.

The United States, not prepared to sign the Accords, makes a unilateral declaration of its position on the Conference conclusions. The United States declares that it will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements and would view any renewal of the aggression with grave concern and as a threat to international peace and security. Unilateral Declaration of the United States, 21 July 1954.....

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94. 184.

Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 July 1954.....

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97\* Memorandum of conversation on 19 January 1961 meeting between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the subject of Laos (prepared by Clark Clifford, 29 January 1967).

98\* Task force report on "A Program of Action for South Vietnam, 8 May 1961.

99. NSAM 52 on steps to strengthen South Vietnam, 11 May 1961.

100\* Lansdale memorandum to Taylor on unconventional war, July 1961.

101\* Cable, Saigon to State on Diem's request for bilateral defense treaty, 1 October, 1961.

102. JCS memorandum for Taylor, Counterinsurgency Operations in South Vietnam, 12 October 1961

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104\* Extracts from recommendations of Taylor report on mission to South Vietnam, 3 November 1961.